This paper evaluates the cases for and against plant closing legislation. In spite of the growth of legislative efforts in the area, there has been surprisingly little effort devoted to analyzing what the effects are of existing plant closing legislation, of provisions in privately negotiated collective bargaining agreements that provide for advance notice in case of plant shutdowns and/or layoffs, and of voluntary employer provision of advance notice. The paper summarizes the results of previous research, and our own empirical analyses that used the January 1984 Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey of Displaced Workers, on the effects of advance notice on displaced workers' durations of nonemployment and post-displacement earnings. Based upon these findings, implications for public policy are drawn. 
Introduction
Most European nations have some form of legislation relating to plant closings or large scale layoffs.1 Typically they call for advance notice ~by employers and for employer negotiations with employees and government over whether the closing can be averted. Often they require severance pay for displaced workers and some, for example Sweden, have detailed programs of labor market services (retraining, placement, public works, wage subsidies) to facilitate adjustments. In Canada, both federal and provincial legislation similarly require advance notice. In many of these countries small establishments with less than one hundred employees are exempt from the requirements, perhaps due to the greater failure rate of small businesses or the belief that a shutdown of a small business does not have a substantial effect on a community.
Plant closing legislation in the United States is much more modest.
As of early 1988, there is no federal law and only a few state laws.
Three states, Maine, Wisconsin and Hawaii, require advance notice of plant shutdowns or large scale layoffs (with size class exemptions), and Maine also requires one week's severance pay per year of service for workers with greater than three years' tenure. The penalties for noncompliance are low in Maine (9500 per establishment) and Wisconsin <950 per employee), but high in Hawaii (three months wages and benefits per laid off worker). Connecticut does not require advance notice, but does require nonbankrupt firms to maintain health insurance and other benefits for workers unemployed by plant shutdowns for up to 120 days. slates; the majority In the northeast and midwest. More than 90 percent of these bills had provisions requiring advance notice of shutdowns, while substantially smaller percentages'required severance pay or economic assistance to either workers, employers, local governments, or potential buyers.
At the federal level, over 40 bills have been introduced into Congress since 1979. In April of 1988, Congress voted to include an amendment In the omnibus trade bill that would have required employers of 100 or mere workers to give 60 days advance notice to workers and local government officials of a plant closing, or a layoff that was planned to last at least six months that involved at least 500 workers or one-third of the employer's workforce. Numerous exemptions were included In this bill that was vetoed by President Peagan.
Proponents of advance notice legislation argue that advance notice provisions will ease displaced workers' shock and facilitate their search for alternative sources of employment or training. Such notice also allows employers, workers and the community to see if ways exist to save the jobs, such as wage concessions, tax concessions, or seeking new ownership, Including the possibility of employee ownership.2
Opponents of the legislation argue that, In addition to restricting the free mobility of capital, advance notice legislation would have a number of other adverse effects on firms. They claim It would increase worker turnover and decrease productivity, as those productive workers with the best opportunities elsewhere would leave and the morale of remaining workers would suffer. It also would decrease the likelihood that buyers of the plant's product would place new orders, that banks would supply new credit, that suppliers would continue to provide services, and that the firm could sell the plant to potential buyers.
Finally, it would depress corporate stock prices. Such a provision, as well as others that, directly increase the costs of plant shutdowns, effectively increase the cost of reducing employment and thus should encourage firms not to expand operation or to substitute overtime hours for additional employment in states where such laws are in effect.
In evaluating the case for advance notice legislation, it is useful to stress the divergence between private and social costs. Qnployers currently do not bear the full social costs of plant shutdowns, both because unemployment insurance is imperfectly experience rated and because the costs these actions impose on communities are not taken Into account by them. As such, imposing a "tax" on plant closings, or large scale layoffs, either in the form of advance notice provisions, severance pay requirements, or maintenance of benefits requirements would offset the 3 difference between the social and private costs of plant closings. These efficiency considerations suggest the need for federal, rather than state-bystate rules, to reduce the possibility that locational decisions by firms would be Influenced by "tax price* differences. Critics, however, would stress that such legislation night encourage the flight of jobs overseas. 
II.
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Lazear ( Folbre, Leighton and Roderick (1984) is the only study of U.S. data that examined the effects of advance notice of plant closings on local area unemployment rates and labor force size. They examined the effects of major plant closings (those involving more than 100 workers) In Maine in the period prior to advance notice becoming mandatory in the state, and found that saiimiao. provision by a firm of at least one month's advance notice to displaced workers significantly diminished the closing's impact on the local area unemployment rate in the month of closing. While this may. reflect more rapid reemployment of displaced workers In the presence of advance notice, their results also suggest that advance notice was associated with a significant reduction in the size of the local labor force in the month of the closing. The latter reflects either labor force withdrawal or outmigration (and possible reemployment elsewhere); they are unable to ascertain which occurred.
Another study, Weber and Taylor (1963) , focused on 32 plant closings in the late 1950s and early 1960s and found that voluntarily provided advance notice rarely led to increased quit rates or decreased productivity of workers. Still a third study, Ho Sen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) studied the experiences of 9,500 displaced workers from 42 plants that closed and found that provision of advance notice was associated with
•iaraer earnings losses for the diaplaced workers; at first glance a somewhat paradoxical result.
In each of the latter three studies (and most of those discussed "below) provision of advance notice was treated as exogenous and this may bias the authors' estimates of the policy's effects. For example, those employers who perceive they would face increased quit rates prior to the shutdown date if they provide their workers with advance notice, may not provide notice, while those employers «ho perceive they would not face increased turnover may do so. To the extent that these perceptions are correct, only low 'expected increase in turnover" firms would provide_ notice and one would not" observe increased turnover in these firms after"
notice" was provided (Weber and Taylor's finding).' However, "this would not tell us anything about the affects of mandated advance notice. Similarly, if advance notice were to arise primarily in situations in which the employment prospects faced by displaced workers were the worst, a comparison of the earnings losses suffered by workers with notice to the tosses incurred by those who failed to receive notice would show that the former lost more (Holer,, et al.'s results) . However, this would not Imply that legally mandated advance notice would make workers worse off.
Recently several studies have analyzed data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics January 1964 SsuaaLfltJUaElififilJio^ <Sffi). a supplement to the ft,rr>nt Population. SumsY. <s« Flaln and Sehgal (1985) ). The SS is a special supplement to a national probability sample of households that was administered to workers permanently displaced during the 1979-84 period due to a Plant shutdown or layoff and it contains Information on whether the individuals received advance notice or expected their displacement.
It contains no Information on whether the notice was formal or how far In advance It was given. This Is a crucial omission, since the effectiveness of advance notice policies presumably depend at least partially on how far in advance notice Is given.
The various studies yield somewhat mixed findings. Howl and Cforthcomlng, 1988) limited her analyses to a small subsampie of the displaced workers located In SMSA's who had been displaced from manufacturing jobs due to a plant shutdown. She found that on average displaced workers who received advance notice did not benefit from the advance notice, although white-collar workers did appear to have shorter durations of noriemployme'nt. In addition, the approximately 10 percent of workers who received advance notice who then quit prior to displacement appeared to suffer smaller wage losses and fewer weeks of nonemployment. Addison and Pedro (1986; 1987a) concentrated their attention on workers displaced due to plant shutdowns and found that, ceteris paribus, the presence of advance notice was associated with durations of nonemployment that were some 35 percent shorter. For workers who received unemployment insurance CUD after displacement (which meant, given UI rules in most states, those with more than one week of unemployment) the negative association of advance notice and duration was found only for white-collar employees. For both white and blue-collar workers who failed to receive UI after displacement, a negative association between advance notice and duration of nonemployment was found. This latter result is not surprising; if advance notice helps some workers to find employment without an intervening spell of unemployment, these workers will never be eligible for UI benefits. Put another way, the presence of advance notice may Increase the probability that displaced workers fall to receive UI. Our results indicate that there is very little evidence that workers who receive advance notice pay for it in the form of iower predisplaceinerit wages. They also suggest that lt"is difficult to explain which displaced workers receive advance notice prior to displacement using data on characteristics of the individuals, data on characteristics of the workforce in the industries in which they were employed, and data on employment growth and unemployment in the areas and areas/industries in which they were employed. While some variables prove significant in formal problt models of the probability of receiving advance notice Cand the equations do have some predictive power), in the main few consistent, patterns are observed across the four groups. These results, together with the results of exogeneity tests we performed, suggest that analyses of the effects of advance notice provisions that use the gQK £an legitimately treat the existence of advance notice as exogenous.
Our analyses do suggest that having advance notice does significantly increase the probability that a displaced worker will experience no. spell of nonemployroent. The largest increase is for males displaced due to a shutdown and the major beneficiaries within this group are white-collar workers. In contrast, once an individual experiences any nonemployment, the presence of advance notice has no effect on the ultimate total duration of reemployment. 4 Advance notice thus seems to help displaced ^workers in the SUM sample only if the individuals can find employment prior to displacement.5
Analyses of the effects of advance notice on survey data earnings echo the findings of Podursky and Swaim C198?b) that, on average, receipt of advance notice has no affect on subsequent earnings once reemployed,
Only for white-collar females who had been displaced-due to a layoff was there any evidence that advance notice leads to higher survey data weekly earnings and this group makes, up less than 15 percent of the SIM sample.
The major effect of advance notice on workers in the £QW sample then is through decreasing the probability of observing positive nonemployment spel1 lengths.
Finally, for the people in the 52M sample who receive advance notice, we find no systematic evidence that observed variables that might be proxies for productivity (job tenure, age, education, previous earnings) systematically are associated with the probability that a worker will quit prior to displacement. Thus, we find no evidence that advance notice will lead a firm's most productive workers to quit, thereby disrupting a firm's operations in its final weeks.
iv. Condi/ding.RciMiiJsa
h number of studies suggest that there are large private costs of displacement to displaced workers but that these costs are oftn transitory in nature. While some fraction of these costs may represent the dissipation of rents, a substantial part represents true social costs (Hamermesh <198?>). Often these costs are transitory In nature -witness the fact that earnings of displaced workers in the Sffl *c were reemployed _at the survey date were, on average within 5 percent of their predisplacement earnings. However, some costs are long-lasting; many people In the SS were not reemployed at the survey date.
Our own research and the literature surveyed above suggests that advance notice may veil facilitate labor market adjustments by allowing displaced workers to find employment prior to their date of displacement.
Advance notice appears to reduce the probability that displaced workers suffer any-spell of nonemployment and thus also may well-moderate temporary Increases in area unemployment, rates. In both a number of the surveyed studies, and our own, "advance notice" included notice of very short duration and thus their results may understate the effects of mandated notice of longer duration. The individual worker based data used in all of the underlying studies also did not permit analyses of whether advance notice of pending displacements can lead to actions (e.g., reorganization, wage concessions, employee ownership) that help avert displacements.
Although opponents of advance notice cite potential costs of such policies, empirical studies have found no evidence that advance notice causes firms' most productive workers to leave and that the productivity of the remaining workers suffers. Moreover, save for Lazear (1987), which we have criticized above, no systematic empirical evidence has been provided on the other potential adverse effects of advance notice that opponents have enumerated.
While at first glance, this discussion suggests that federal!'/ mandated advance notice for displaced workers may be an idea whose time has come, several cautions are In order. First, the effects of voluntary provision of advance notice in situations where workers expect impending displacement anyway may be very different from the effects of mandated advance notice in situations where the impending displacement Is completely unexpected by workers.6 2 ndee d, one should recall that the SDW, which our research and most of the research we surveyed was based upon, asked only if workers received advance notice 2£ expected their displacement.
Future researchers will have access to the January 1988 Survey of Displaced Workers which specifically asks displaced workers if they received formal advance notice and, if so, how long the notice was.
However, even with these data, to adequately estimate the effects of advance notice per se will require researchers to try to model what displaced workers' expectations of displacement would have been in the absence of advance notice. Put another way, researchers need to estimate if forma! advance notice actually conmunicates new information to workers.
Second, the observation that the voluntary provision of advance notice appears to reduce the probability a displaced worker will suffer any spell of nonemployroent does not necessarily imply that mandated advance notice will increase employment and decrease unemployment rates.
Indeed, one can conceive of situations in which displaced workers compete for * fixed number of vacant positions that only a fraction of them can obtain. Advance notice gives those workers who receive notice an advantage; it increases their probability of finding one of these jobs prior to displacement. However, if the number of vacant positions is truly fixed, by necessity the probability that workers who failed to receive notice find jobs would have to go down. In this case, the gains "to those workers who received notice would come solely at the expense of those workers who failed to receive notice. There would be no social gains from advance notice in the sense that, on average, it would not influence aggregate employment levels and/or unemployment rates.
Studies that use individual-based data sets, such as our own and the others that used the £DW. can not test for the possibility of such displacement effects. The only study of U.S. data that addressed this issue, Folbre, Leighton and Roderick C1984) did find evidence that voluntary provision of advance notice led to smaller temporary increases in area unemployment rates. However, Lazear's (198?) cross-country study found no significant effects of mandated advance notice on national tmployment levels and unemployment rates. Cieariy more studies that focus on the affects of advance notice on area economic outcomes are needed.
Suppose for a moment, however, that all voluntarily provided advance notice actually does is "reshuffle* jobs among displaced workers from those people who fail to receive notice to those people who do receive it.
In fact, evidence of this might strengthen the case for government mandated advance notice if the people who receive notice voluntarily are the ones least in need of such assistance. For example, H high wage unionized workers were more likely to receive notict than comparably skilled lower wage nonunion workers, implementation of federal legislation would allow the latter a "better shot" at competing with the former for the available jobs when they are displaced.7 one thus might be in favor of advance notice legislation because of its potential redlstrlbutlve affects, even if one believes it will have no net affect on employment or ^unemployment.
Ultimately, given all the evidence presented and cited above, the position one takes towards advance notice legislation will depend heavily on one's preconceptions as to hoy labor markets function. It is Important when designing an intervention, however, to be clear about the source of public concern. If the major concern Ss the externality imposed on a local community due to a plant closing or large scale layoff, then public policy should specifically address this concern.
Such a concern may argue for advance notice legislation. However, in this case, exemptions based on absolute size, including current proposals, do not address this problem as well as exemptions based on size relative to the local labor market, In contrast, if the source of concern is the private costs workers suffer from displacement, then severance pay provisions may be a viable alternative and/or addition to advance notice legislation.
We conclude from the existing evidence that the social costs of worker displacement would be substantially reduced by a federal policy relating to advance notice. There are several policy options. Tne federal government could reduce the costs to firms of providing such notice by funding a share of the unemployment benefits received by notified workers and/or by reducing the firms' income tax rates.
Another alternative is experimental adoption of federal legislation that provides for advance notice of plant closings or permanent layoffs.
Weil-designed research during the experimental period could be used to more adequately address issues relating to the macro labor market effects of the legislation, including whether advance notice of impending displacement can serve to help prevent displacement from occurring, as proponents of the legislation often assert. Since so much of prior research has focused on the potential benefits of advance notice legislation, studies during the experimental period might also profitably seriously research issues that opponents have been concerned about, relating to the costs of the legislation.
Isainslss. i.
In what follows often we use "plant closing" as a shorthand for
•plant closing and/or large scale layoff*. During the 1979-1983 period, approximately 49 percent of permanently displaced workers were displaced due to plant closings (see Flair, and Sehga! (1985) for example), 2. If workers are displaced, the maintenance of health insurance provide needed service for individuals during a period when stress leads to increased incidence of physical and mental ailments. Payments by firms to the communities In which shut plants were located would help alleviate the extra demands placed on these communities for aocia! services that-the shutdowns cause; demands that would arise at the same time that local property and sales tax revenue were being reduced.
3. This line of reasoning suggests that the case for mandated advance notice is stronger when the displaced workers represent a large share of the local labor force. The displacement of 100 workers in a relatively small community is likely to represent much more of an externality than a similar size displacement In a large city. Somewhat surprisingly, neither existing nor proposed legislation takes this into account.
4. The SM data do not permit us to differentiate multiple spells of noneroployment, nor to distinguish between unemployment and nonpartlcipation. Our conclusions therefore apply to total noneraployment time from the date of displacement to the survey date.
5. Swaim and Podgursky C1988) reach a similar conclusion in recent research that uses data from both the Sffi and a similar supplement that was part of the January 1986 £uxJ£JOLL^omlALLfin_Suxv££. Their paper cites
